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It’s 1919 Somewhere
WHAT TENNESSEE WINE & SPIRITS RETAILERS
ASSOCIATION V. THOMASMEANS FOR THE
NATIONAL HANGOVER OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
AMENDMENT, THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND FEDERAL LEGALIZATION OF INTOXICATING
SUBSTANCES
INTRODUCTION: THE ALCOHOL PROBLEM
The United States has a drinking problem; or rather, an
alcohol problem.1 Since the earliest days of colonization, alcohol has
played an important role in the cultural and economic fabric of our
country, serving a variety of uses from social lubricant tomakeshift
currency.2 For just as long, alcohol has been a source of controversy,
offending the sensibilities of those who view its consumption as a
damper on economic productivity, or even a moral wrong.3
While on an intuitive level this issue does not seem
inherently endemic to our historic understanding of our liberties
as Americans, few matters are as central to our national identity
as the regulation of alcohol.4 Alcohol regulation implicates a core
question that is endemic to many debates in our federalist
system:5 how is a national government supposed to regulate a
substance or behavior that a vocal group of citizens finds
offensive while preserving another group’s freedom to partake in
such behaviors?6
1 SeeDANIELOKRENT, LASTCALL: THERISE ANDFALL OFPROHIBITION 7 (2010).
2 See TOMSTANDAGE, AHISTORYOF THEWORLD IN 6GLASSES 115–16 (2005).
3 Id. at 116.
4 See SEAN BEIENBURG, PROHIBITION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATES’ RIGHTS 8
(2019) (“Prohibition eventually exposed two related fault lines in American political thought:
the proper role of individual rights and choice against government regulation . . . and the
proper allocation of state and federal power.”).
5 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 286 (James Madison) (New. Am. Library 2003)
(“[A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people,
the voice of every good citizen must be, [l]et the former be sacrificed to the latter.”).
6 SeeBEIENBURG, supranote 4; see alsoOKRENT, supra note 1, at 83–84 (noting how
in the political battle prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, anti-Prohibition
activists could be characterized as being culturally out-of-step with the “archetypal American”).
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This dilemma reached a fever pitch during the early
twentieth century, when Congress passed the Eighteenth
Amendment, which constitutionalized a ban on “themanufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof
for beverage purposes.”7 This national Prohibition began as a
result of special interest groups looking to eliminate what they
perceived as a social wrong.8 The movement gained traction
through association with other civil rights campaigns, such as the
abolition of slavery or gender equality.9
However, it soon became clear that the answer to this
conflict would not come through overarching federal regulation.
Between the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919
and its repeal in 1933, support for national Prohibition waned as
the public was disheartened by the federal government’s strict
enforcement regime.10 Concurrently, state legislators chafed under
the frictional political climate that the amendment engendered.11
By the end of Prohibition, it seemed that this conflict had
reached an effective stalemate with the ratification of the Twenty-
First Amendment, which replaced, yet did not totally repeal, the
prohibitory Eighteenth Amendment.12 By establishing that “[t]he
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited,” section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment was a
compromise, allowing states to continueProhibition at the discretion
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
8 SeeBEIENBURG, supranote 4, at 9 (“[L]oosely alignedmoral societies picked up the
torch of temperance . . . as many of the same reformers engaged in the abolitionist movement
sought to improve society through voluntarist solutions like temperance education . . . . ”).
9 See id. at 9–10 (“Like other nineteenth-century reform movements, antialcohol
efforts partly developed fromwomen’smoral uplift organizations.”);RICHARDF.HAMM,SHAPING
THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY,
1880–1920 24 (1995) (“[T]he first temperance advocates to confront liquor sellers
directly . . . were middle-class women.”).
10 SeeW. H. Stayton, The Prohibition Law Is Discriminatory and Hypocritical,
in AMENDMENTSXVIII ANDXXI PROHIBITION ANDREPEAL 59, 59–62 (Sylvia Engdahl ed.,
2009) (arguing that the “increased arrests” caused by Prohibition “show conclusively the
unpopularity of the law and the consequent impossibility of its enforcement”); see also
OKRENT, supra note 1, at 255 (detailing how, during the mid-1920s, “[b]y one accounting,
U.S. attorneys across the country spent, at minimum, 44 percent of their time and
resources on Prohibition prosecutions”).
11 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 209–12.
12 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2467 (2019).
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of their state legislatures.13 Thiswasnot ahollowpromise, as at least
one state continued to prohibit the possession of alcohol until 1966.14
After Prohibition, the question of who had what authority
over the regulation of alcohol continued to plague the state and
federal governments, as the rebirth of state liquor markets
implicated issues arising under the commerce clause.15 While this
conflict existed prior to Prohibition,16 it became strained as states’
ventures to explore their powers under the Twenty-First
Amendment ran headlong into Congress’s expansion of its
authority under the dormant commerce clause (DCC).17 Over time,
clearly defined grants of authority began to emerge, such as the
acceptance of the three-tiered system of regulation.18 Under the
three-tiered system, states issue licenses for producers,
wholesalers, and retailers of alcohol, with the caveat that
“participants at each tier generally may be involved in only one
major stage of bringing an alcoholic beverage to market.”19
Throughout its recent Twenty-First Amendment cases, the
Supreme Court has frequently reiterated that the three-tiered
system is “unquestionably legitimate.”20 However, the
compromises that created this state-based regulatory system
occurred haphazardly, creating inconsistencies in the Court’s
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; see also Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct at 2467
(noting that section 2 “gave each State the option of banning alcohol if its citizens so chose”).
14 Prohibition Void, Mississippi Told; State Repealed It by Taxing Liquor, A Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1966), https://www.nytimes.com/1966/04/09/archives/prohibition-
void-mississippi-told-state-repealed-it-by-taxing.html [https://perma.cc/NS9U-65DQ].
15 See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 61–62 (1936),
abrogated by Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 485–86 (2005). The commerce clause,
codified in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority “[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. While the provision was originally read narrowly as a safeguard against state
protectionism, it later expanded to give Congress the authority over almost any commercial
good or behavior. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379. U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (holding that the commerce clause gives Congress the authority to regulate public
accommodations at local businesses); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22U.S. (9Wheat.) 1, 209–11 (1824)
(enumerating Congress’s regulatory power under the commerce clause). For further
analysis, see Section I.B of this note.
16 See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1888) (holding that an Iowa law that
banned the manufacture of alcohol within the state for the purposes of exportation does
not violate the commerce clause).
17 While not explicit within the text of the Constitution, the DCC refers to the
principle that Congress may prohibit a state’s regulation of its own intrastate commerce
if the state regulation would needlessly encumber interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493 (holding that New York and Michigan statutes banning out-
of-state wineries from selling directly to consumers are violative of the DCC); Bacchus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (holding that a Hawaii law exempting a
liquor unique to the state from a wholesaler tax violates the DCC).
18 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2457.
19 Alexa Bordner, Note, How New York Drinks: If and How Third-Party
Providers Can Integrate with the Three-Tier System, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 251, 252 (2017).
20 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495
U.S. 423, 432 (1990)).
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Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence that further obfuscate
which regulations are and are not permissible under the DCC.21
The most recent skirmish on this front was heard before
the Supreme Court in 2019, in Tennessee Wine & Spirits
Retailers Association v. Thomas.22 At issue in Tennessee Wine &
Spirits was a Tennessee law that required all individuals
applying for retail liquor licenses within the state to have been
a resident of Tennessee for at least two years.23 In their defense
of the law, the respondents, “a trade association of [Tennessee]
liquor stores,” argued that section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment allowed Tennessee to regulate the distribution of
alcohol, even if such regulation discriminated against interstate
commerce.24 The Court held that the Tennessee law was
unconstitutionally violative of the DCC.25 In an opinion written
by Justice Alito, the majority presented a history of the
legislation leading to Prohibition and its eventual conclusion
with the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment.26 The
majority’s interpretation of this history led it to conclude that
the amendment was merely meant to “‘constitutionaliz[e]’ the
basic understanding of the extent of the [s]tates’ power to
regulate alcohol that prevailed before Prohibition,” namely that
states have the power to ban alcohol if they so choose.27
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he argued that the same history of
the Twenty-First Amendment cited by the majority led to the
conclusion that states had the full power to pass residential
requirement laws as a part of their Twenty-First Amendment
powers.28 In particular, Justice Gorsuch expressed concern that
the Court’s ruling would leave the states ill-suited “to ensure
retailers will be amenable to state regulatory oversight,” as the
sale of alcohol moves from in-state to online retailers.29
21 See Amy Murphy, Note, Discarding the North Dakota Dictum: An Argument
for Strict Scrutiny of the Three-Tier Distribution System, 110MICH. L. REV. 819, 819 (2012)
(arguing that the three-tier distribution system “imposes a physical presence requirement”
that would violate the DCC based on the court’s reasoning inGranholm); see also Jonathan
M. Rotter & Joshua S. Stambaugh, What’s Left of the Twenty-First Amendment?, 6
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 601, 625–26 (2008).
22 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2449.
23 Id. at 2457.
24 Id. at 2458–59.
25 Id. at 2473–76.
26 Id. at 2456, 2463–67.
27 Id. at 2467 (first alteration in original) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
206 (1976)).
28 Id. at 2476–80 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 2482; Oral Argument at 42:35,Tenn.Wine&Spirits, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-
96), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-96 [https://perma.cc/35TL-3FYV] [hereinafter Oral
Argument] (“But isn’t the next businessmodel just to try and operate as theAmazon of liquor?”).
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At a glance, Tennessee Wine & Spirits can be read as a
simple reiteration of the Court’s DCC jurisprudence as it
pertains to the Twenty-First Amendment throughout the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.30 To that end, one
might be led to assume that the Amendment is a fait accompli,
nothing more than a band-aid placed over the wounds opened by
the Eighteenth Amendment.31 After all, the Noble Experiment32
came and went just shy of a century ago.
However, if construed carefully, the impact of the
Twenty-First Amendment could easily reverberate for another
hundred years. As Prohibition fades further into hindsight, how
the Court interprets states’ regulatory power under the Twenty-
First Amendment may have vast effects on the emerging
legalization of other similarly regarded intoxicating substances,
such as marijuana33 or psychotropic drugs.34
As of December 2020, fifteen states, along with the District
of Columbia, have legalized marijuana for recreational use,
despite the drug’s classification as a Schedule I drug under the
Controlled Substances Act.35 Legalization of marijuana in the
United States has largely occurred through the establishment of
regulatory schemes at the state level and a declination on the part
of the federal government to enforce its laws within states’
30 Compare Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2469 (“[T]he developments leading
to the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment have convinced us that the aim of section 2
was not to give States a free hand to restrict the importation of alcohol for purely protectionist
purposes.”), with Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484–85 (2005) (“The [Twenty-First]
Amendment did not give States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to
discriminate against out-of-state goods.”), and Craig, 429 U.S. at 206 (“Even here, however,
the Twenty-first Amendment does not pro tanto repeal the Commerce Clause . . . . ”).
31 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2462–63.
32 The use of the phrase “Noble Experiment” to refer to Prohibition emerged from
a speech by President Herbert Hoover, in which he referred to the Eighteenth Amendment
as a “great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose.”
HERBERTHOOVER, THEMEMOIRSOFHERBERTHOOVER: THECABINET AND THEPRESIDENCY,
1920-1933 201–02 (1952). Ironically, Hoover was not amused with the popularity the
“unfortunate phrase” soon achieved. Id. at 202.
33 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 241 (“[T]he states’ constitutional fight over
Prohibition in the 1920s . . . is even more relevant to the conflict between state
legalization of marijuana and ongoing federal prohibition of that substance.”).
34 See Jon Murray, Denver First in U.S. to Decriminalize Psychedelic Mushrooms,
DENVER POST (May 10, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/08/denver-psyc
hedelic-magic-mushroom/ [https://perma.cc/F6L4-XBKX].
35 Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 21 U.S.C. § 812(c); Marijuana
Legalization, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/issues/legalization/
[https://perma.cc/LH4L-NGL3].
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borders.36 Eventually, further pursuit of marijuana legalization
will necessitate federal legislation on the matter.37
This note articulates a more nuanced reading of section 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment that better accommodates the
tension between the state and federal governments with regard
to states’ rights to regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol—
a framework that could be employed in the future when
considering conflict pertaining to the federal legalization of
marijuana. More specifically, this note argues that the Court’s
continued reading of section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
in Tennessee Wine & Spirits as an “on-off” switch for the
complete prohibition of alcohol within a state will ultimately
leave the courts ill-equipped to handle conflict between the state
and federal governments for the seemingly inevitable federal
legalization of marijuana. This interpretation ultimately leaves
the states to mire in the no-man’s land of ill-defined powers that
currently plagues them with regard to alcohol regulation,38
particularly as the industry comes to embrace online retail and
mobile delivery services.39 As a solution, this note presents an
alternative approach to analyzing section 2 arguments under
the existing DCC framework that provides more leeway to states
in crafting their regulation of intoxicating substances.
Part I of this note outlines a brief history of alcohol
regulation and the DCC, and how those doctrines intersect in
36 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 241–43; Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day
Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in an Age of Overlapping
Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2015) (“The history of
marijuana legalization over the past decades suggests that, at least on some issues,
contemporary nullification is a winning strategy.”).
37 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 246. The parties advocating for the
legalization of marijuana have largely avoided presenting legalization as a states’ rights
issue, likely in an effort to earn constituents in “generally progressive-leaning states,” as
the issue of states’ rights has become a touchstone of modern conservative politics. Id. at
246–48. Granted, the Court has already considered the issue of conflict between federal
and state marijuana regulation in 2005, when it held that the federal government had
the authority under the commerce clause to prohibit the private cultivation of medical
marijuana for personal use, despite a California statute authorizing that same behavior.
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). However, in that case, the federal government
was using the commerce clause to authorize its enforcement of the CSA. Id. at 15. In
contrast, if (and most likely when) a conflict of state and federal marijuana regulation
comes before the Court under a regime of federal legalization, the most analogous
doctrine to govern its analysis would likely be its Twenty-First Amendment
jurisprudence. See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 249 (articulating the possibility of a
federal marijuana law that echoes the interpretation of the Webb-Kenyon Act
underpinning the Court’s reasoning in Tennessee Wine & Spirits).
38 See discussion infra Section III.B.
39 SeegenerallyAdultBeverageE-commerceLeaderDrizlyNowAvailable inOver100
Markets AcrossNorthAmerica, PRNEWSWIRE (June 22, 2018, 9:10AM), https://www.prnewswi
re.com/news-releases/adult-beverage-e-commerce-leader-drizly-now-available-in-over-100-mar
kets-across-north-america-300670755.html [https://perma.cc/9VE2-F423] [hereinafter Adult
Beverage E-commerce].
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Tennessee Wine & Spirits. Part II of this note summarizes the facts
and analysis ofTennesseeWine&Spirits and explores the potential
impact of the Court’s holding on the existing methods of alcohol
regulation available to states, with particular emphasis on the
emergence of online retailers and third-party distributors. Finally,
Part III proposes an alternate reading of section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment that would grant states limited capabilities to
override the DCC in their regulation of alcohol.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The central issue in Tennessee Wine & Spirits—as in most
Twenty-First Amendment cases—stems from a long-standing
conflict between two constitutional provisions: the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause.40 The dialog between these
two provisions is complicated by their distinct, but similarly
complex, jurisprudential histories.
A. The Twenty-First Amendment: Prohibition as a States’
Rights Issue
In Tennessee Wine & Spirits, the Court reinforced the
well-established understanding that the Twenty-First
Amendment was meant to be a compromise between the
Prohibition states and the alcohol-drinking states to preserve
states’ interest in the enforcement of their police powers.41
However, these divided ideologies did not always coexist so
easily. While early prohibition efforts were rooted in an
amalgamation of social issues, initially states’ rights was not one
them.42 However, as the northern-stemming temperance
movement began to migrate south, it was swept into the region’s
fervent defense of state sovereignty.43 Additionally, as these
efforts led to the passage of state Prohibition laws, subsequent
lawsuits brought by liquor manufacturers forced anti-
40 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461–
62 (2019).
41 Id. at 2467.
42 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 9–10.
43 Id. at 10–11. It is worth noting, as Beienburg concedes, that many southern
proponents of Prohibition adopted the states’ rights argument for Prohibition, along with
many other issues, as a method of implementing racially discriminatory policies in a
post-bellum political climate. Id.
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prohibitionists to focus their legal arguments on the conflict
these laws created between state and federal law.44
However, taking state Prohibition statutes nationwide
would prove to be a more difficult task.45 Through the late
nineteenth century, states struggled to implement extraterritorial
Prohibition through a legislative tug-of-war with the judiciary.46
Early attempts to prohibit the importation of liquor led the Court
to establish the “original package” doctrine—a doctrine indicating
that states could not prevent the importation and sale of liquor
from out of state, so long as the liquor remained in its original
package.47 Consequently, states were limited in the degree towhich
they could prohibit the sale of alcohol within their borders.48
In response, Congress attempted to rejuvenate the
hamstrung states’ prohibitory efforts by passing the Wilson Act
in 1890.49 By declaring that “[a]ll fermented, distilled, or other
intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or
Territory . . . shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or
Territory,” the act sought to give each state a right, akin to a
right of first refusal, to police alcohol within its borders.50 If a
state did not exercise this right, it would succumb to the Court’s
original package doctrine as the proverbial “[l]aw of the [l]and.”51
44 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (holding that a Kansas law
prohibiting the manufacture of liquor for sale within the state was not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also HAMM, supra note 9, at 55 (“The
legitimacy of state prohibition laws raised perplexing issues of federalism that the liquor
industry could exploit in its struggle against the movement.”).
45 See HAMM, supra note 9, at 57 (“While radical prohibitionist organizations
called for federal legislation . . . they played little role in shaping the legislation that
Congress passed [in 1890].”).
46 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2464–65.
47 Id.; see also Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 159–160 (1890) (Gray, J.,
dissenting) (noting that beyond the original package doctrine, a more restrictive anti-
import statute would require federal legislation), abrogated by Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005); Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 513–15 (1888) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the original package doctrine is a sufficient prohibitory
measure to “protect the health and morals of the people”). For a more detailed review of
these opinions, see Lindsay Rogers, Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Before
the Webb-Kenyon Act, 4 VA. L. REV. 174, 187–95 (1916).
48 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478 (“[State prohibitory statutes] could ban the production
of domestic liquor, but these laws were ineffective because out-of-state liquor was immune from
any state regulation so long as it remained in its original package.” (internal citations omitted)).
49 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2465 (“[T]he strategy of those who
favored the Wilson Act was for Congress to eliminate the problem that had surfaced in
Bowman and Leisy by regulating the interstate shipment of alcohol.”).
50 27 U.S.C. § 121; Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2465 (“[TheWilson Act’s]
goal was more modest: to leave it up to each State to decide whether to admit alcohol.”).
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Under what is known as the supremacy clause of
the U.S. Constitution, when there is a conflict between federal and state law, the federal
law applies. See id.; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 769 (1994).
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However, the Wilson Act only demonstrated the gap in
understanding between Congress and the Court as to the
authority each state had over alcohol.52 Shortly after the act’s
adoption, the Court narrowly read the statute so that it did not
take effect until the alcohol in question had been delivered to the
individual who had ordered it, a reading which ultimately “failed
to relieve the dry states’ predicament.”53 Effectively, the Court’s
ruling meant that the act only applied to individuals seeking to
consume alcohol in dry states, leaving the alcohol industry itself
fully intact in those same states.54
Once it became evident that the Wilson Act would not
achieve its legislative purpose, Congress again sought to augment
the states’ prohibitory authority through the Webb-Kenyon Act.55
In contrast to the Wilson Act, which framed Prohibition as a grant
to states’ police power, the Webb-Kenyon Act’s ban on “the
shipment or transportation . . . of any spiritous, vinous, malted,
fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one
State . . . into any other State . . . either in the original package or
otherwise, in violation of any law of such State” served as a federal
affirmation of existing state law.56
Additionally, while the Wilson Act was reluctantly upheld
by the Supreme Court, the Webb-Kenyon Act received far more
enthusiastic support from the Justices.57 For a brief period, as
more states began to implement a variety of prohibitory
legislation, theWebb-Kenyon Act was held up as a perfect balance
of federal and state interests, ensuring that “dry America would
be sheltered from its neighbors’ vices and wet America
unburdened by its neighbors’ moralism.”58 However, this balance
was not meant to last, as prohibition advocates interpreted the
Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Webb-Kenyon Act as a signal
to campaign for complete Prohibition at the federal level.59
52 An early draft of the Wilson Act bill was supported by the understanding
that Leisy v. Harden gave Congress the authority to enact legislation that was more
permissive to the states. Lindsay Rogers, Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors
Before the Webb-Kenyon Act, 4 VA. L. REV. 288, 295–96 (1917).
53 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 480;
Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898); Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898)).
54 Id. at 2465–66.
55 Id. at 2466 (citing 27 U.S.C. § 122).
56 Id. at 2466 n.10 (first and second alterations in original); see BEIENBURG,
supra note 4, at 28.
57 See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 332 (1917).
58 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 28.
59 See HAMM, supra note 9, at 225 (“Indeed, many drys saw the Clark decision
as a key step to total [P]rohibition.”).
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While this goal was eventually achieved with the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919,60 by the end
of the next decade the cause had lost the limited public support
that had pushed Prohibition through Congress.61 Consequently,
by this time, Congress had to determine how to implement a
repeal measure that would satisfy the remaining anti-
prohibition advocates while maintaining the dry states’ valued
Eighteenth Amendment rights.62
The solution was implemented by dividing the Twenty-
First Amendment into two substantive guarantees: section 1 of
the amendment repeals federal Prohibition under the Eighteenth
Amendment and section 2 prohibits “[t]he transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof.”63 As careful readers might note, this
language echoes that of the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts,
allowing Congress to revert back to the federally endorsed state
regulatory schemes established under those laws.64 With that, the
Noble Experiment of Prohibition was over. However, the
amendment it left in its wake would prove to be no less vexing to
those seeking to incorporate this new constitutional right into the
increasingly comprehensive federal regulatory system.65
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
61 This article will not address the causes of Prohibition’s failure in detail, as they are
highly complex andmultifarious. However, in summary, they include a rise in organized crime,
stifling of commerce by federal regulators, and even the deaths of civilians due to the poisoning
of alcohol by the federal government. See generally David J. Hanson, Many Advocates of
Prohibition Became Disillusioned by its Consequences and Sought Repeal, in AMENDMENTS
XVIII ANDXXIPROHIBITIONANDREPEAL, supra note 10, at 77, 77–83 (describing how business
owners who supported Prohibition became frustrated with the costly regulations that
accompanied it); Emily G. Owens, The American Temperance Movement and Market-Based
Violence, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 433, 441–45 (2014) (indicating the correlation between
Prohibitionandhomicide rates in regionsknown for organized crimeduring theProhibitionera);
Deborah Bloom, The Chemist’s War, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://slate.com/
technology/2010/02/the-little-told-story-of-how-the-u-s-government-poisoned-alcohol-during-
prohibition.html [https://perma.cc/M3R8-WGSU] (detailing the Federal alcohol denaturing
program that led to the deaths of thousands by drinking poisoned alcohol during Prohibition).
62 See Tenn.Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2467 (2019).
63 U.S.CONST. amend.XXI, §§ 1–2.Section3of theTwenty-FirstAmendmentmerely
establishes that the Amendmentmust be ratified “within seven years” of its presentation to the
states. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3. As the Amendment was ratified by the end of the year in
which it was introduced, it is, at least for the purposes of this article, effectivelymoot.SeeRepeal
of Prohibition, NAT’LCONST.CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amend
ment/amendment-xxi [https://perma.cc/VTJ8-DKX4].
64 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976).
65 See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936)
(analyzing how the newly ratified Twenty-First Amendment impacts the Court’s
commerce clause analysis).
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B. Interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment Under the
DCC
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.”66 This provision, known as the
commerce clause, was born out of the Founding Fathers’ eagerness
to prevent the interstate protectionism that had rendered the
Articles of Confederation nonviable as a framework for national
government.67 Consequently, case law over the following decades
led to the understanding that the power to regulate commerce is
shared between Congress and the states.68
Many of the Court’s early commerce clause cases, at least
in relation to the regulation of alcohol, focused onmaintaining the
balance of federal control over commerce and states’ eagerness to
regulate the sale and production of alcohol.69 In these early cases,
state regulations were given wide deference by the Court, even as
it impacted commerce beyond that state’s borders.70 However, this
deference was likely due to a then-narrow reading of Congress’s
commerce clause power.71
In the aftermath of Prohibition, state regulation of alcohol
and federal regulation of interstate commerce did not mix together
so easily.72 In early cases, the Court read into the recently ratified
Twenty-First Amendment a broad grant of authority.73 In fact, the
Court’s interpretation of the amendment was so broad that it
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67 Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA.L.REV. 1877, 1890 (2011) (“[M]any people
in the [late eighteenth century], including . . . some of the most influential Framers, believed
interstate discrimination to be an extremely serious problemmeriting a profound response.”).
68 SeeMaine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (holding that a Maine statute
imposing bans on imported baitfish did not violate the commerce clause); S.C. State
Highway Control Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938) (holding a
South Carolina law imposing weight limits on trucks travelling on state highways was
within the state’s regulatory authority).
69 See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1888); Thurlow v. Mass. (License
Cases), 46 U.S. (5. How.) 504, 530 (1847).
70 See Kidd, 128 U.S. at 22 (“It is true that . . . [the challenged state legislation’s]
effects may reach beyond the State by lessening the amount of intoxicating liquors exported.
But it does not follow that, because the products of a domestic manufacture may ultimately
become the subjects of interstate commerce, at the pleasure of the manufacturer, the
legislation of the state respecting such manufacture is an attempted exercise of the power to
regulate commerce exclusively conferred upon congress.”).
71 Kidd was decided on the Court’s reasoning that interstate commerce did not
include manufacturing, a distinction the Court would later reject. Compare Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U.S. at 22–23, withWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (“Whether the subject
of the regulation in question was ‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not
material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us.”).
72 See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936),
abrogated by Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
73 See id.
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threatened to override Congress’s authority under the commerce
clause74 and even the equal protection clause.75
The buzz of this newfound authority, however, quickly
wore off.76 Shortly after the ratification of the Twenty-First
Amendment, the Court was already experimenting with an
expansive conception of the commerce clause that would prove
necessary to support the federal regulation that was essential to
then-President Roosevelt’s New Deal Program.77
Additionally, this era heralded a reconsideration of the
Court’s DCC jurisprudence.78 Previously, DCC inquiries hinged
on whether the state regulation at issue directly or indirectly
affected interstate commerce.79 Yet in the New Deal era, the
Court’s inquiry focused on whether the state commercial
regulation upset the balance between Congress’s and states’
respective regulatory powers.80 In other words, the Court’s prior
analysis hinged on the state regulation’s proximity to interstate
commerce, while its new analysis focused on whether the state
was attempting to regulate commercial activity that was best
suited to federal oversight.81 While this new standard was better
adapted to the broad scope of commerce in an increasingly
74 Id. (holding that a state had the right to charge a fee for a liquor importation
license under the Twenty-First Amendment, even though such a provision would
ordinarily be violative of the DCC).
75 Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 404 (1938) (affirming a state
statute that requires state approval of all brands of imported liquor on the grounds that “[a]
classification recognized by the Twenty-First Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the
Fourteenth”), abrogated by Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). The equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state cannot “deny to any personwithin
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76 See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 392 (1941) (holding that an
Arkansas statute banning the importation of liquor without a license did not raise a
Twenty-First Amendment question).
77 SeeWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1937) (holding that the commerce clause grants Congress
the authority to regulate a labor dispute within a multi-state corporation, even though
the dispute in question took place entirely within Pennsylvania); see also About NLRB:
1937 Act Held Constitutional, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-
nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1937-act-held-constitutional [https://perma.cc/P364-A6SE].
78 SeeBrannon P. Denning,Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
50WM.&MARYL.REV.417, 436–46 (2008) (detailing the evolution of theCourt’sDCCanalysis).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 445–46.
81 See id. For example, during this period, the Court held that states could pass
regulations limiting the size and weight of trucks that travelled on state highways. See
S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938). Conversely,
the Court held that a state could not pass a regulation that would force trains to modify
their length to pass through the state. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 783–84 (1945).
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modernized economy,82 it still failed to yield “a coherent set of
rules to decide [DCC] cases sensibly.”83
In the decades that followed, as federal regulation under
the DCC persisted and liquor laws became more permissive
nationwide,84 the Twenty-First Amendment began to seem like
a remnant from a bygone era.85 Additionally, in many of these
late twentieth century cases, the Twenty-First Amendment
became an unsuccessful last-ditch argument for alcohol laws
that were blatantly protectionist86 or unconstitutional on other,
frequently discriminatory, grounds.87 Yet paradoxically, when
deciding these cases, the Court frequently reiterated the
Twenty-First Amendment’s status as an unassailable grant of
authority to the states.88
Two cases best reflect the modern standard for conflicts
between state authority under the Twenty-First Amendment and
federal regulation under the DCC.89 In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, the Court considered whether a Hawaii liquor tax that
included an exemption for a type of brandy unique to the state
was unconstitutional on DCC grounds.90 In its defense, the state
argued that it had the authority to implement the tax under
section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.91 The Court rejected
the state’s Twenty-First Amendment argument on the grounds
that the state’s goal of “promot[ing] a local industry” was not
“designed to promote temperance or carry out any other purpose
of the Twenty-first Amendment.”92 While the majority in Bacchus
82 See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767 (“Thus the states may regulate matters which,
because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress.”).
83 See Denning, supra note 78, at 448. In particular, Denning notes that in the
absence of underpinningdoctrinal principles, the rules that theCourt employs to decide an issue
may haphazardly become “calcifi[ed],” and subsequently mistaken for doctrine. Id. at 449–53.
84 See generally NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, DRY AMERICA IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2016) (detailing the decreased support for “dry” jurisdictions across
the greater United States).
85 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (“Once passing beyond the
consideration of the Commerce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to
other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful.”).
86 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1984).
87 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 204–05.
88 Id. at 206 (“This Court’s decisions since have confirmed that the Amendment
primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.”); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964) (“[T]he scope of the Twenty-first
Amendment with respect to a State’s power to restrict, regulate, or prevent the traffic and
distribution of intoxicants within its borders has remained unquestioned.”).
89 SeeGranholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467 (2005);Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265, 273.
90 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265–66. The reasoning behind plaintiffs’ argument in
Bacchus—with which the Court ultimately agreed—is that by placing a tax on all liquor
except certain liquors native to Hawaii, the state is ultimately discriminating against
liquors made outside of Hawaii. Id. at 265–66, 273.
91 Id. at 274.
92 Id. at 276.
274 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1
admitted that Court’s prior section 2 jurisprudence was difficult
to parse,93 Bacchus signaled that the Twenty-First Amendment
would no longer support states’ attempts to regulate the
intrastate liquor market for purely commercial purposes.94
However, the Court would not engage in significant discourse on
which state purposes would be “sufficiently implicated”95 by the
Twenty-First Amendment for another two decades.96
At issue in Granholm v. Heald, the second of these two
cases, was a set of Michigan and New York laws that allowed in-
state wineries to ship their products directly to consumers, but
forbade out of state wineries from doing the same.97 Relying on
the line of cases interpreting the Wilson Act, the Court
concluded that there was nothing in the legislation preceding the
Twenty-First Amendment to indicate that states ever had the
power to override the DCC in their regulation of alcohol.98 In
doing so, the Court abrogated many the earliest cases
interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment99 and reaffirmed its
recent precedent favoring a more narrow reading.100
In the aftermath of Granholm, lower courts struggled to
reconcile the protections of the Twenty-First Amendment with
the Court’s strong repudiation of any interpretation that favored
discrimination against interstate commerce.101 Indeed, the
Court’s dismissal of a broad interpretation of the Twenty-First
Amendment in Granholm begged the question of which rights
were retained by the states under the amendment, other than the
93 Id. at 274 (“No clear consensus concerning themeaning of [section 2] is apparent.”).
94 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21 (“The most notable of these
developments was the Court’s position in Bacchus that states may regulate the use and
transportation of alcohol within their borders . . . if the regulations are consistent with
the ‘core concerns’ of the Twenty-first Amendment.”).
95 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275.
96 Most of the Court’s Twenty-First Amendment cases between Bacchus and
Granholm focused on conflicts between state authority under the Twenty-First Amendment
and First Amendment Free Speech guarantees. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (“[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify the constitutional
prohibition against laws abridging the freedom of speech embodied in the First
Amendment.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486 (1995) (“States clearly possess
ample authority to ban the disclosure of alcohol content—subject, of course, to the same First
Amendment restrictions that apply to the Federal Government.”).
97 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466–67 (2005).
98 Id. at 478 (“By its own terms, the Wilson Act did not allow States to
discriminate against out-of-state liquor . . . . ”).
99 Id. at 485–86.
100 Id. at 488. While the Court cited Bacchus to support its argument that the
Twenty-First Amendment does not allow for state protectionism, it once again declined
to conduct Bacchus’s inquiry into whether the states’ statutes implicated core concerns
of the Amendment, or even to further elucidate those concerns. Id.
101 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 648–49 (“What ‘discrimination’
means under [the holding of Granholm] is now the subject of lower court opinions that
have already parted ways on significant issues.”).
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right to implement complete Prohibition.102 Further clarification,
if any, would be uncorked in Tennessee Wine & Spirits.
II. TENNESSEEWINE & SPIRITS RETAILERS ASSOCIATION V.
THOMAS
In Tennessee Wine & Spirits, the Court considered
whether a durational residency requirement for retail liquor
licenses violated the DCC.103 The majority in Tennessee Wine &
Spirits answered this question in the affirmative, holding that
section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment did not give states the
right to implement protectionist measures, even in its regulation
of alcohol.104 In the process, it employed an analysis that, like
Granholm and Bacchus before, vastly limited the scope of
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence.105
A. Facts and Background: Residency Requirements and
Retail
At issue in Tennessee Wine & Spirits was a provision of
Tennessee law governing the requirements for retail liquor licenses
in the state.106 Under this law, “any individual . . . who has not been
a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two year period”
prior to that individual’s application for a retail liquor license is
ineligible to receive a license.107 Before the events giving rise to the
case, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) had
stopped enforcing the law at the recommendation of the attorney
general, who had advised that the law violated the DCC.108
As a result of the TABC’s nonenforcement policy, when two
businesses owned by nonresidents applied for liquor licenses in
2016, their applications were slated for approval by the TABC.109
102 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488–89 (“A State which chooses to ban the sale
and consumption of alcohol altogether could bar its importation; and, as our history
shows, it would have to do so to make its laws effective.”).
103 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 (2019).
104 Id. at 2476.
105 See discussion infra Section II.C.
106 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2456–57. Tennessee regulates the sale of
alcohol using the three-tiered system, in which distributors, wholesalers, and retailer
within the alcohol trade are regulated separately. Id. at 2457. For a further discussion
of the three-tiered system, see infra Part III of this note.
107 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A). The law also required ten years of
residency to renew a retail liquor license, and that all corporations applying for a retail
liquor license must be entirely owned by Tennessee residents. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 57-3-
204(b)(3)(B). However, only the former was at issue in Tennessee Wine & Spirits. Tenn.
Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2457.
108 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2457–58.
109 Id. at 2458.
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Before the licenses could be granted, the TennesseeWine & Spirits
Retailers Association (the Association) threatened to file suit
against the TABC for their violation of the durational residency
requirement.110 In response to a request for a declaratory judgment
by the TABC, the Middle District of Tennessee held that the
residency requirement was unconstitutional.111 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed,112 although the Court did not agree
unanimously on whether, as the Association argued, the state had
the authority to impose the two-year residency requirement under
section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.113 TheCourt granted the
Association’s petition for certiorari to consider “the disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals about how to reconcile our modern
Twenty-first Amendment and [DCC] precedents.”114
B. Analysis: A Tale of Two Prohibitions
The majority in Tennessee Wine & Spirits began its
analysis with a brief history of the DCC.115 Although the Court
acknowledged recent criticisms from some Justices, it reiterated
the doctrine’s intended function of preventing protectionism
among the states.116 Additionally, the Court highlighted the need
to read each constitutional provision, i.e., section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment and the DCC, as part of a comprehensive
regulatory scheme.117
The majority then examined the legislative history of the
Twenty-FirstAmendment.118 In particular, themajority emphasized
states’ difficulty in passing prohibitory regulation within the
confines of the commerce clause, a process that culminated in the
passage of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, and later, the
Eighteenth Amendment.119 From this, the majority reinforced its
precedential interpretation of section 2 as being “meant to
110 Id.
111 Id. (citing Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 259 F. Supp. 3d 785,
797 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)).
112 Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 883 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2018).
113 See id. at 629 (Sutton, J., concurring).
114 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2459.
115 Id. at 2459–60 (“[T]he proposition that the Commerce Clause by its own force
restricts state protectionism is deeply rooted in our case law.”).
116 Id. at 2457.
117 Id. at 2460 (“[I]t would be strange if the Constitution contained no provision
curbing state protectionism, and . . . no provision other than the Commerce Clause could
easily do the job.”).
118 Id. at 2463–68.
119 Id. at 2464–67.
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‘constitutionaliz[e]’ the basic understanding of the extent of the
States’ power to regulate alcohol” under the Webb-Kenyon Act.120
Turning to the issue at bar, the majority rejected the
Association’s attempts to distinguish Tennessee’s durational
residency requirement from the protectionist measures that the
Court had previously invalidated in cases like Granholm or
Bacchus.121 Furthermore, the majority distinguished its recent
Twenty-First Amendment cases from those decided shortly after
the amendment’s ratification, which the majority read as too
deferential to the states and thus untenable under the Court’s
current DCC doctrine.122
After reaffirming its narrow reading of states’ powers
under section 2, the majority analyzed the durational residency
requirement in light of the DCC’s requirement that facially
discriminatory statutes be narrowly tailored to serve the local
interests that the statute was enacted to protect.123 In doing so,
it rejected the Association’s arguments that the provision is
meant to aid in “oversight over liquor store operators” or to
ensure that license holders will serve as “responsible
neighborhood proprietor[s].”124 Consequently, the majority
affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s holding of the durational residency
statute as unconstitutional.125
Justice Gorsuch, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas,
rejected the majority’s interpretation of early precedent.126
Particularly, the dissent argued that by presenting the Twenty-
First Amendment to the states for ratification, Congress, as the
legislative body that has the power to regulate interstate
commerce, meant to codify an “exception to the . . . Commerce
Clause.”127 Consequently, the dissent casts the majority’s Twenty-
First Amendment jurisprudence as a retrofitting of the doctrine to
accommodate an expansive DCC.128
120 Id. at 2467 (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
206 (1976)).
121 Id. at 2471–72.
122 Id. at 2472–74.
123 Id. at 2461, 2474; see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
354 (1951) (establishing that a statute that discriminates against interstate commerce
on its face must be “justified in view of the character of the local interests and the
available methods of protecting them”). This type of analysis is commonly referred to as
“strict scrutiny.” See Denning, supra note 78, at 421–22.
124 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2475–76.
125 Id. at 2476.
126 Id. at 2477–81 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2478 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)).
128 See id. at 2480–81.
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C. Aftermath: Section 2 as an “On-Off Switch”
On its face, the holding of Tennessee Wine & Spirits
merely affirms Granholm’s holding that section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment does not give states the authority to enact
protectionist measures in the alcohol market.129 However, the
Court’s analysis in Tennessee Wine & Spirits represents an even
greater limitation of section 2—one that drastically limits states’
power to regulate alcohol.130
Post-Granholm, scholars posited that if state alcohol
regulations were to be subject to the same anti-protectionist
limitations that other state regulations were bound by under the
DCC, then section 2 would do little more than preserve a state’s
right to implement the complete prohibition of alcohol within its
borders.131 For example, a state action to regulate the method of
ordering alcohol from manufacturers would draw DCC scrutiny
from federal courts.132 While the Court in Tennessee Wine &
Spirits did not explicitly adopt this limited interpretation, the
Court’s analysis indicates that such a reading may have been its
implied intent.133
In Tennessee Wine & Spirits, the Court held that section 2
“allows each State leeway to enact the measures that its citizens
believe are appropriate to address the public health and safety
effects of alcohol use and to serve other legitimate interests.”134
Taken on its own, this text implies that section 2 still confers some
unique authority on the states, namely, the authority to restrict the
sale and use of alcohol for the safety of its citizens.135 However,
when considered in the context of the Court’s recent Twenty-First
Amendment cases,136 it becomes evident that even when states
attempt to regulate alcohol in the interest of public health, the
129 Id. at 2474 (majority opinion).
130 Id. at 2474.
131 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 608 (“[I]f liquor is subject to all of the
constraints of the Dormant Commerce Clause . . . a state can choose either (1) to be dry, and
permit no liquor . . . or (2) to allow all alcohol without respect to its geographic origin.”).
132 See Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 432–33 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding that aKentucky law requiring shipments from small wineries to be ordered in person
was discriminatory against interstate commerce and, thus, merited strict scrutiny).
133 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2455 (“[S]ection 2 [of the Twenty-First
Amendment] . . . gave each State the option of banning alcohol if its citizens so chose.”).
134 Id. at 2474. However, the Court also held that “[section 2] does not license
the States to adopt protectionist measures with no demonstrable connections to [public
health] interests.” Id.
135 See id. at 2462 (“[T]he interpretation of any provision of the Constitution must
begin with a consideration of the literal meaning of that particular provision . . . . ”).
136 See id. at 2474–76; see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
715 (1984) (“Although a state regulatory scheme obviously need not amount to a
comprehensive attack on the problems of alcohol . . . the selective approach Oklahoma
has taken . . . suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it asserts here.”).
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Court still interrogates the effectiveness of the regulation in
protecting this public health interest, an inquiry that precisely
echoes the narrow tailoring requirement of discriminatory
regulation under the DCC.137 When state regulations fail to meet
this standard, the Court ultimately suggests less discriminatory
measures that amount to modifications of the state’s existing
implementation of the three-tiered system.138
Consequently, under this reasoning, the only unassailable
authority available to states after Tennessee Wine & Spirits is to
employ section 2 as an “on-off switch,” allowing states to either
ban alcohol completely or allow it subject to the DCC’s
antidiscrimination restrictions.139
III. SECTION 2 IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The majority’s holding in Tennessee Wine & Spirits
continues the judicial trend of obscuring themeaning of section 2 as
it relates to the DCC.140 Further, the analytical framework
employed to arrive at this holding presents regulatory challenges to
an increasingly modernized liquor industry.141 Yet all the same, the
issue of reconciling these seemingly contradictory provisions so that
the Twenty-First Amendment retains some semblance of purpose
persists. This section introduces a novel analysis for DCC inquiries
that implicate section 2 using a more deferential standard for state
regulation motivated by public health—one that is already
recognized under theCourt’s existingDCC jurisprudence—to better
accommodate the purposes of both provisions.
A. “Liquor Like Everything Else”142
The majority’s reasoning in Tennessee Wine & Spirits
indicates a strong step toward alcohol being regulated like any
other good under the DCC.143 Under this standard, any regulation
137 SeeDeanMilk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354–55 (1951) (holding that a
state cannot discriminate against interstate commerce, “even in the exercise of its unquestioned
power to protect thehealthandsafety of its people, if reasonablenondiscriminatoryalternatives,
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available”).
138 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2476. In particular, the majority in
Tenn. Wine & Spirits suggests that the state implement existing statutes that “promote
responsible sales and consumption practices” through “limit[ing] both the number of
retail licenses and the amount of alcohol that may be sold to an individual” and
“mandat[ing] more extensive training for managers and employees.” Id.
139 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 608.
140 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2470.
141 See Oral Argument, supra note 29; see also Bordner, supra note 19, at 266.
142 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 611.
143 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2469–70 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly
declined to read section 2 as allowing the States to violate the ‘nondiscrimination
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that discriminates against interstate commerce is analyzed with
strict scrutiny.144 Admittedly, it is difficult to interpret statutes
like the durational residency requirement at issue in Tennessee
Wine & Spirits as anything more than a protectionist measure,
particularly when read in conjunction with the other statutory
provisions.145 However, the blatant protectionism at play in
Tennessee Wine & Spirits does not eliminate the possibility of a
discriminatory measure that is narrowly tailored to serve a
legitimate local public health purpose.146
Simply put, the public health concerns at play in the
regulation of alcohol are different from those that govern the
regulation of milk,147 fruit,148 or most other products at issue in the
Court’s DCC jurisprudence.149 In its earliest form, Prohibition was
conceived as a way to prevent the societal harms caused by
overconsumption of alcohol, such as poverty or domestic abuse.150
From early temperance reformers’ perspectives, these problems
were exacerbated by a federally mandated interstate market that
made alcohol readily accessible.151
The lack of a legitimate public health exception or
presumption in the Court’s Twenty-First Amendment
jurisprudence leads to courts implementing a commerce clause-
based analysis that few state statutes can withstand, even if they
are largely motivated by nondiscriminatory purposes.152 As the
Court’s interpretation of the DCC has expanded to accommodate
an increasingly national economy,153 it has also given less
consideration to public health (i.e., temperance) as a legitimate
principle’ that was a central feature of the regulatory regime that the provision was
meant to constitutionalize.”).
144 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951); see also
Denning, supra note 78, at 421–22.
145 While the dissent posits that the durational residency requirement at issue
in Tennessee Wine & Spiritsmight have the ultimate effect of raising the price of alcohol,
and thereby discouraging its purchase, Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2483–84
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), considering that (1) the Tennessee statute made it almost
impossible for a non-Tennessean to participate in the retail liquor market and (2)
Tennessee Wine & Spirits arose out of a retail association’s objection to the TBAC’s non-
enforcement of the durational residency requirement, the majority’s classification of the
statute as protectionist is warranted. Id. at 2456–58, 2474 (majority opinion).
146 See Denning, supra note 78, at 421–22.
147 See Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 350.
148 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970).
149 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 614–15.
150 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 10 (“Temperance movements argued that
alcohol . . . . contributed not only to women’s physical harm but also to their poverty.”).
151 SeeHAMM, supra note 9, at 2 (“Clearly, as [temperance reformers] perceived,
the federal system complicated temperance reformers’ tasks.”).
152 See Elyse Grossman & James F. Mosher, Public Health, State Alcohol
Pricing Policies, and the Dismantling of the 21st Amendment: A Legal Analysis, 15MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 198–200 (2011).
153 See sources supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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justification for states’ rights under section 2.154 Yet at the same
time, the Court continues to acknowledge that there is some
alcohol-specific power, however residual, that is still reserved for
the states.155 Paradoxically, throughout Tennessee Wine & Spirits,
the majority reiterates the necessity of reading the Twenty-First
Amendment and the DCC as part of a “unified constitutional
scheme.”156 This unification process, however, seems to focus less
on finding a way for the two doctrines to coexist than for one to be
narrowly interpreted such that it is swallowed by the other.157
This is not to say that section 2 should give states unlimited
authority to override the DCC, or even that the Court’s recent
Twenty-First Amendment cases were incorrectly decided. Rather,
the fractured analysis underpinning the Court’s interpretation of
section 2 has led to the formation of an ad hoc doctrine that leaves
states without a clear standard by which to craft prohibitive
statutes so that they will not be struck down under the DCC, even
as the market for alcohol grows more complicated.
B. The Three-Tiered Distribution System and Third-Party
Providers
After the Court’s holding in Tennessee Wine & Spirits, it
would seem that the three-tiered system of distribution remains
one of the only methods of state alcohol regulation that the Court
will find permissible.158 Yet the Court’s endorsement of the three-
tiered system serves as an example of the complicated reasoning
154 See Grossman & Mosher, supra note 152, at 198–99 (“[T]he courts have
shifted to curtailing the scope of the 21st Amendment in favor of protecting interstate
commerce interests . . . . at the expense of the states’ interest in protecting its citizens
from the potential harms of alcohol.”).
155 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2474
(2019); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1984).
156 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2462.
157 Granted, one could argue that by requiring that state statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce be narrowly tailored to support a legitimate local interest, which
includes public health, the DCC effectively protects the same state interests as section 2. See
DeanMilk Co. v. City ofMadison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951). Yet this explanation still does not
acknowledge that under this unified scheme, an entire Constitutional amendment is being
interpreted into a state of virtual obsolescence, as no state in the country currently exercises
its right to implement completeProhibition.Notably, thiswas a concern held by someJustices
during the Court’s early Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence. See Duckworth v.
Arkansas, 314U.S. 390, 399 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“If the Twenty-first Amendment
is not to be resorted to for the decision of liquor cases, it is on the way to becoming another
‘almost forgotten’ clause of the Constitution.”).
158 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2474–76; see also id. at 2483 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (arguing thatGranholm affirmed theCourt’s support of the three-tiered system
inNorthDakota); Rotter&Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 644 (questioning if, afterGranholm,
“the three-tier system [will] be the only remaining mark of the years of political turmoil that
preceded the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment?”).
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that guides modern Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence.159
Generally, under the three-tiered distribution system, a state’s
alcohol market is divided among “producers, wholesalers, and
retailers.”160 Each level of the distribution system receives a
different license from the state, and each level, listed above in
descending order, can only sell alcohol to the level below it.161
In North Dakota v. United States,162 the Court noted that
the three-tiered system is “unquestionably legitimate,”163 a
dictum that the Court has reiterated in subsequent Twenty-
First Amendment cases.164 However, several complications arise
when evaluating the applicability of this statement. North
Dakota was a plurality opinion that did not involve a DCC
challenge.165 Additionally, the plurality in North Dakota based
its support of the dictum on Young’s Market, a case that has
since been abrogated by the Court in Granholm.166
Although litigants inmany recentTwenty-First Amendment
cases have argued that the three-tiered distribution system would
not survive the heightened standard of review applied to state
alcohol laws in recent Twenty-First Amendment cases,167 the Court
continues to hold firm to its legitimacy.168 Yet lower court cases have
159 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 21, at 823 (arguing that the three-tiered
system, if “subjected to more rigorous scrutiny,” might be found to violate the DCC).
160 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2457.
161 Id. Additionally, wholesalers are also allowed to sell to other wholesalers,
and retailers are allowed to sell to consumers. Id.
162 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990). At issue in North
Dakota was a state statute that required special labelling on shipments of alcohol to
military bases within North Dakota by out-of-state distributors. Id. at 426.
163 Id. at 432. This phrase has been referred to by at least one author as the
“North Dakota Dictum,” a term which this note will continue to employ. See Murphy,
supra note 21, at 823.
164 See Tenn. Wine& Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2471 (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.
460, 488–89 (2005));Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488–89 (citingNorth Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432).
165 North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 426; see alsoMurphy, supra note 21, at 833.North
Dakota did not raise a DCC issue because the party being burdened was the Federal
government, and thus the case did not concern interstate commerce. North Dakota, 495
U.S. at 434–39.
166 North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432 (citing State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s
Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936), abrogated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460).
167 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2471; Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488–89;
Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006).
168 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (citingNorth Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432). TheNorth
Dakota Dictum is a prime example of a calcified doctrine, which occurs when the Court
“confuse[s] the doctrine with the constitutional value or command it is supposed to
implement.” See Denning, supra note 78, at 449–52. Granted, in some DCC cases, the
Court has differentiated between discriminating against interstate goods and
discriminating against out-of-state producer. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437
U.S. 117, 125 (1978). However, the Court does not appear to have ever suggested this as
an avenue to shore up its support of the North Dakota Dictum.
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determined that “states have not produced compelling arguments to
justify the system’s discriminatory aspects.”169
As state alcohol markets begin to incorporate technology
into the sale and delivery of alcohol, the rigidity of the three-tiered
distribution may yet prove to be a barrier to efficient regulation.
Consider the integration of third-party provider (TPP) services
into New York’s retail liquor market. Most TPPs take the form of
a mobile application that allows consumers to order alcohol for
delivery from local retail liquor stores.170 These services vary in
the degree to which they work with the retail liquor stores to
market to consumers, raising concerns as to whether TPPs are
“availing” themselves of the stores’ retail licenses.171
For example, the New York State Liquor Authority
(NYSLA) held that ShipCompliant, which “worked with an
advertiser to provide licensees . . . with a mechanism to sell their
products online through unlicensed Internet advertising
platforms,” violated state liquor laws by “allow[ing] an advertiser
to engage in conduct constituting the sale of alcoholic beverages
by an unlicensed entity.”172 In contrast, NYSLA held that Drizly,
a marketing service which allowed consumers to place orders for
delivery from local liquor stores, was not violative because it
allowed retailers to “maintain[ ] full control of its operation and
pay[ ] a flat fee for strictly marketing services.”173
NYSLA174 has issued several declaratory rulings
adjudicating the validity of TPP services under New York State
liquor laws.175 In its early consideration as to whether various TPPs
are availing themselves of a retailer’s liquor license, NYSLA has
focused on the degree to which: (1) the TPP acts in place of the
retailer; and (2) the TPP “ha[s] an ownership or financial interest
in the [retail liquor store].”176 However, in subsequent rulings,
169 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 843 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schnorf,
738 F. Supp. 2d 793 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Siesta Village Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp.
2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008)).
170 See, e.g., Operation of Smartphone/Web Application Drizly, Declaratory
Ruling 2013-02526, at 1 (N.Y. State Liquor Auth. Sept. 25, 2013), https://sla.ny.gov/syste
m/files/documents/2018/09/2013-02526-operationofsmarphone-webapplicationdrizly.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5YE-YBYL] (“Drizly is a smartphone/web app that enables customers to
purchase alcoholic beverages for delivery.”).
171 See Bordner, supra note 19, at 276.
172 Id. at 266.
173 Id. at 268.
174 Agency Mission Statement, N.Y. STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, https://sla.ny.gov/
agency-mission-statement [https://perma.cc/F6ZA-QXC8] (“The [NYSLA] . . . seeks to work
cooperatively with community leaders and industry members to ensure participation by all
agency stakeholders in the licensing and enforcement processes.”).
175 See Bordner, supra note 19, at 265–72.
176 Id. at 268 (first alteration in original) (citing Operation of Smartphone/Web
Application Drizly, Declaratory Ruling 2013-02526, at 2).
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NYSLA has created exceptions to these original considerations,
occasionally contradicting itself in the process.177
Consequently, without firmprinciples guiding its regulation,
this system has descended into “an ‘anything goes’ attitude toward
TPP relationships with licensees.”178 Furthermore, it is theorized
that other TPPs have interpreted this scattershot regulation as a
grant of leniency by the state.179 As a result, these TPPs “have likely
not requested . . . evaluation of their business models,” making it
“likely that those companies are availing themselves of their
partners’ licenses to sell alcohol.”180 In other words, because the
states are so strongly encouraged by the Supreme Court to hold fast
to the three-tiered system, TPPsmay be able to effectively engage in
the sale of alcohol without a license inwhatmight otherwise be seen
as a violation of those states’ laws.181
Despite these complications, other states have issued
regulations that echo NYSLA’s TPP rulings.182 However, these
efforts have yet to yield regulatory measures that could provide
a uniform framework for implementation across states with
diverse economic landscapes.183
NYSLA’s struggle to establish clear regulatory guidelines
for TPPs demonstrates that even as the Court supports the
constitutionality of the three-tiered system, notwithstanding the
murky precedent for this support, the proliferation of TPP services
has led to a host of complications that this “unquestionably
legitimate” system was meant to prevent.184 As these services
continue to take hold in the retail liquor market,185 as they have in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic,186 they will only exacerbate
the shaky underpinnings of the three-tiered system.
177 Id. at 269.
178 Id. at 272.
179 Id. at 273.
180 Id.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 280–81. For example, California allows TPPs to operate without a
license, even if this means the TPPS are involved with “taking part in the exchange of
money.” Id. In contrast, the District of Columbia prohibits TPPs from collecting payment
directly from consumers. Id.
183 Id. at 283.
184 See id. at 253–54 (“TPPs unquestionably challenge the structure of the
three-tier system.”).
185 Id.
186 SeeCameron Costa,Drinking, Social Distancing and a Booze-Delivery-App Boom,
CNBC (Mar. 31, 2020, 10:42 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/drinking-coronavirus-
social-distancing-and-alcohol-delivery-app-boom.html [https://perma.cc/9CYK-3PPW].
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C. Leniency for Public-Health Motivated Alcohol Laws
Tennessee Wine & Spirits indicates the Court’s desire to
subject discriminatory state alcohol laws to strict scrutiny, as
though alcohol were any other good under the DCC.187 However, as
the above argument demonstrates, such an approach obfuscates
the states’ powers under section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
to the point of near obsolescence, yielding a regulatory scheme that
is both self-contradictory and difficult to adapt to an increasingly
technologized market. The majority and dissenting opinions in
Tennessee Wine & Spirits reflect the “winner take all” discourse
surrounding the conflict between the Twenty-First Amendment
and the DCC, where one doctrine is presented as subservient to or
overriding the other.188 However, these interpretations create a
false dichotomy where one does not need to exist.
There are two solutions to this conflict between section 2 and
the DCC. The Court could overrule the North Dakota Dictum,
holding that the three-tiered distribution system is
unconstitutionally discriminatory against interstate commerce
under the DCC.While this approach has its appeal in the interest of
doctrinal consistency, the three-tiered distribution system is so
thoroughly entrenched in most state alcohol markets189 that to
abolish itwould require an overhaul of alcohol regulation on anearly
national level.190 Additionally, this approach does little to address
theCourt’s continued, albeit ambiguous, acknowledgement of states’
power to regulate alcohol under section 2.
Alternatively, courts could subject state alcohol regulation to
a lower standard of DCC review if the state can show that it was
enacted in the interest in public health, rather than with a purpose
to discriminate against out of state alcohol commerce. Under the
Court’s modern DCC jurisprudence, through what is known as the
Pike standard, a state regulation that does not on its face
discriminate against interstate commerce is analyzed by comparing
the benefits conferred by the regulation to the burden the regulation
187 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 21, at 625–26.
188 Compare Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449,
2470 (2019) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly declined to read section 2 as allowing the States
to violate the . . . regulatory regime that the provision was meant to constitutionalize.”),
with Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2482 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has
lately begun flexing its dormant Commerce Clause muscles . . . to strike down state laws
even in core areas of state authority under section 2.”).
189 See NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM: A
MODERN VIEW 4–5 (2015).
190 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 843–46. While Murphy suggests that “the
Constitution mandates” that “state legislatures develop new regulatory schemes” in place of
the three-tier system, this seems like a costly solution for a problem that could be solved
through a more nuanced interpretation of the Constitutional provisions at play. Id. at 846.
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places on interstate commerce.191 Arguably, courts already engage in
this analysis to some degree when applying strict scrutiny to
discriminatory statutes, in that they operate under the implicit
assumption that the benefits the state gains from the discriminatory
statute could likely be obtained through a more narrowly tailored
statute.192 In otherwords, under thePike standard, the regulation at
issue is given a proverbial judicial benefit of the doubt with regard
to its motivations for discriminating against interstate commerce,
whereas under strict scrutiny, the state must argue in favor of its
regulation against the barrier of the court’s suspicion.193
Analyzing state alcohol regulation under the Pike
standard would encourage courts to consider the actual effects
of the state regulation rather than dismiss it in favor of some
modification to the three-tier system. Additionally, allowing
public health-based state alcohol regulation to circumvent strict
scrutiny would give more credence to the Court’s continued
assertion of the Twenty-First Amendment’s conferral of rights to
the states while continuing to affirm its holding that the
amendment does not allow states to override the DCC.
Ultimately, this approach would allow states to regulate
the alcohol market for a legitimate government purpose while
preventing statutes that serve solely protectionist measures.
Opponents of this approachmight highlight the difficulty of sorting
out which state regulations are actually motivated by a
discriminatory purpose, as public health or temperance is raised in
defense of the discriminatory statutes in almost every Twenty-
First Amendment case discussed herein.194 However, the Court has
developed methods of determining the intended purpose of
legislation, whether through examining a statute’s legislative
history, or by imposing a more holistic inquiry into the “motivating
191 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). (“Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
192 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (“Our issue
then is whether the discrimination inherent in the [ ] ordinance can be justified in view
of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them.”).
193 Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“[T]he extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”), and
Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354 (holding that, under strict scrutiny, states cannot pass
discriminatory regulations “even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the
health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate
to conserve legitimate local interests, are available”).
194 See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449,
2475–76 (2019); see also Grossman & Mosher, supra note 152, at 199 (detailing the
failure of state legislatures to “articulate [the temperance purpose] and to have it
reflected in [prohibitory statutes]”).
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factor[s]” behind the statute.195 Thus, the question of intent could
be answered by imposing a pleading requirement where, to receive
a more deferential standard of review, states must prove that the
statute was enacted to serve the purpose of the core concerns of the
Twenty-First Amendment.
Additionally, if a prohibitory law otherwise poses an
unjust burden on an individual’s rights, its repeal could be
pursued through other constitutional provisions better suited to
that purpose, such as the First Amendment’s free speech
clause196 or the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process197 and
equal protection clauses,198 as they have in the past.199
CONCLUSION: SMOKE ON THE HORIZON
In Tennessee Wine & Spirits, the Supreme Court
continued its trend of minimizing states’ authority under the
Twenty-First Amendment in relation to the DCC.200 In the
process, it further called into doubt the future of a doctrine that
has proven to be unwieldy from its inception, yielding
contradictory adjudicatory standards and unclear grants of
authority. Furthermore, as state alcohol markets continue to
become further enmeshed with internet commerce, it is evident
that this problem will not go away.201
However, this does not have to be the case. The Court can
adopt a middle-ground solution by incorporating an exception for
public health-motivated alcohol regulation into its existing DCC
analysis by analyzing the regulationunder themore deferentialPike
standard.202 This would grant states the leeway to draft specialized
195 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–
68 (1977) (enumerating the factors a court could consider to infer discriminatory intent
in equal protection claims.); Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An
Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce, 86MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1091 (2002) (“[T]he difficulty of ascertaining
motive is not unique to the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
196 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (holding
that a Rhode Island law limiting the display of advertisements featuring liquor prices to
be violative of the First Amendment).
197 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (holding that a
Wisconsin statute that allowed police to post warnings to retail liquor stores so that they could
not sell alcohol to individuals without notice was violative of the Due Process Clause).
198 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma law
that established a higher minimum drinking age for men than women for the
consumption of low-alcohol beer was violative of the equal protection clause).
199 Tenn. Wine & Spirits, 139 S. Ct. at 2477 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (“Everyone
agrees that state laws must still comply with, say, the First Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
200 Id. at 2473 (majority opinion).
201 See Adult Beverage E-commerce, supra note 39.
202 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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alcohol regulations that the Twenty-First Amendmentwasmeant to
confer, while preserving the rights of the federal government to
review that regulation as part of a comprehensive national economy.
Additionally, a more pragmatic Twenty-First Amendment
jurisprudence would have applications beyond the regulation of
alcohol. In broad strokes, the similarities between Prohibition and
the criminalization of marijuana are readily apparent.203 Both goods
were the subject of controversial federal regulation in the early
twentieth century in response to public outcry.204 Subsequently, in
the waning of that federal regulation, both goods have been
regulated under a multitude of legislative systems by the states.205
The constitutional argument opposing the
criminalization of marijuana has been largely untouched,
despite having stronger constitutional underpinnings than
Prohibition.206 This is particularly strange, as the current
presidential administration has publicly acknowledged the
regulation of marijuana as a state issue.207 Given this admission,
the pursuit of federal legislation granting states the right to
regulate marijuana appears to be a viable path to widespread
decriminalization.208 As marijuana legalization at the federal
level becomes more cognizable, a Twenty-First Amendment
jurisprudence that incorporates enumerated exceptions to the
DCC would prove helpful in drafting federal legalization
legislation and resolving any state-federal conflicts that occur
within the legal marijuana market.209
Consequently, it is not unrealistic to consider a federal
marijuana legalization statute that echoes the Webb-Kenyon Act,
giving states limited authority to police the substance within their
borders.210 By interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment in a way
that resolves the conflict that it creates between the federal
government and state governments, both the courts and state
203 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 241 (“[T]he states’ constitutional fight over
Prohibition in the 1920s . . . is even more relevant to the conflict between state legalization
and ongoing federal prohibition of [marijuana]. Structurally speaking, the issues appear to be
quite similar at the state level, and, in the most important policy aspects, they are.”).
204 Herbert E. Tucker, Back to the Future: How the Legalization of Marijuana
Echoes the Prohibition Era, 44 COLO. LAW. 87, 87 (“Both the prohibition of alcohol and
criminalization of cannabis were created through legislation promulgated in an
atmosphere of hysteria rooted in fear and racial bias.”).
205 Id. at 89.
206 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 243.
207 Kyle Jaeger, President Trump Reiterates His Administration Will Let States
Legalize Marijuana, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.marijuanamoment.
net/president-trump-reiterates-his-administration-will-let-states-legalize-marijuana/
[https://perma.cc/5SA9-E3RQ].
208 See BEIENBURG, supra note 4, at 243.
209 See id. at 241–42.
210 See id. at 249.
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legislatures could transform this current doctrine into a more
comprehensive framework to regulate intoxicating substances.
Ultimately, decisions like Tennessee Wine & Spirits represent
another stumble in the United States’ unsteady record of alcohol
regulation. It’s high time for a more controlled solution.
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